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Abstract: This paper will examine the dynamics of devolution in the United Kingdom 
since the 2007 elections to the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales 
which resulted in the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru entering government for 
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Introduction 
When Labour delivered devolution in the United Kingdom after referendums in 1997, 
they did so knowing, in Ron Davies oft-quoted words, that devolution would be ‘a 
process, not an event” (Davies, 1999).  They also did so from a position of strength in 
the “Celtic fringe”, winning a “plurality of the Welsh vote at every UK General Election” 
since 1922 (Scully and Elias, 2008: 103n) and becoming the dominant party in Scottish 
politics in 1964 (Blondel, 1968; Hutchison, 2001).  They had no expectation then, that 
by 2007 that nationalist parties in both the Scottish Parliament and the National 
Assembly for Wales (NAW) would emerge in government.  Indeed, with Labour’s worst 
performance in a Wales-wide election since 1918 (Scully and Elias, 2008: 106) and 
Scottish Labour’s failure to win a plurality of votes and seats in Scotland for the first 
time since 1955 (Jones, 2008: 24), this was a historic change in devolved politics.  The 
Scottish National Party (SNP) explored coalition options which quickly evaporated and, 
while they managed to obtain a minor agreement with the Scottish Green Party, they 
decided to govern as a minority.  In Wales, however, coalition discussions were 
ongoing for a period of two months after the election, with several options on the table 
– a Labour minority administration (though with only 26 of the 60 seats in the NAW, this 
was never a feasible long-term option), a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition (which had 
existed previously), a so-called rainbow coalition of Plaid Cymru-Conservatives-Liberal 
Democrats (which was touted heavily, only to fall on Liberal Democrat support) and the 
final outcome, a Labour-Plaid Cymru coalition (McAllister and Cole, 2007: 543).   
Thus, the 2007 devolved elections ended with two parties in government whose desire 
to change the constitution of the United Kingdom was clear from their manifestos.  The 
SNP had promised the 
“Publication of a White Paper detailing the concept of Scottish 
independence in the modern world as part of preparations for offering 
Scots the opportunity to decide on independence in a referendum, with a 
likely date of 2010.” 
(SNP, 2007: 8) 
Plaid Cymru’s manifesto called for 
“A referendum during the next Assembly term to establish a Proper 
Parliament for Wales, on the model set out in the Government of Wales 
Act, 2006.” 
         (Plaid Cymru, 2007: 36) 
This commitment was carried into government through the One Wales Agreement with 
the Welsh Labour Party, which committed both parties to use the provisions of the 
Government of Wales Act “to the full” and “to proceed to a successful outcome of a 
referendum.”  In order to do so, the coalition would “set up an all-Wales Convention” to 
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engage the public in discussions about devolution and extending the powers of the 
NAW (Labour/ Plaid Cymru, 2007: 6). 
This paper will examine these combined strategies towards affecting constitutional 
change in detail, arguing that using means of public engagement – consultation and 
referendum – parties who have campaigned for an extension of powers for the 
devolved institutions have sought to establish further legitimacy and credibility for their 
demands.  In each case, a lengthy consultation process has opened the debate up to 
public scrutiny and engagement as a precursor to a national plebiscite on the issue of 
the respective constitutional goals.  In Scotland, the SNP’s ambition was to have a 
referendum solely on independence, with an affirmative vote providing the Scottish 
Government the legitimacy to open negotiations with Westminster over a settlement 
resulting in Scottish independence (Scottish Government, 2007: 35).  As the 2007-11 
parliamentary session moved on, it became clear that a single-option referendum was 
a non-starter with the opposition parties, and thus a multi-option paper with 
independence, enhanced devolution (later known as “devo-max”) and the status quo as 
options, became the argument.  However, in the later part of the term, First Minister 
Alex Salmond recognised even that concession lacked the support of the other parties 
in the Scottish Parliament, and the referendum bill was postponed further in the hope 
that the SNP were in a position to introduce a similar bill in the next parliamentary term.  
In Wales, Plaid’s ambition was less controversial: to activate the clause in the 
Government of Wales Act 2006 which would trigger a referendum, with a positive 
outcome leading to the block devolution of legislative powers to the NAW in fields set 
out the Act itself (Government of Wales Act, 2006: 111 [section 94]).  In the latter case, 
Plaid’s goal of extending the power of the NAW was shared by each of the parties 
represented in Cardiff Bay while in the Scottish case, opinion on constitutional change 
is much more varied, with each party taking a distinct position along a centralist-
decentralist axis.  One thing that is clear is that in both cases, the ‘debate is no longer 
about whether change is needed, it is about what form that change should take’ 
(Crawford, 2010: 95). 
1. A National Conversation 
The SNP held to their manifesto commitment and produced a White Paper entitled 
Choosing Scotland’s Future – A National Conversation in August 2007, only three 
months after taking office.  The White Paper itself set out what the Scottish 
Government viewed as three “realistic choices” for the future of Scotland. These were: 
maintaining the status quo of a Scottish Parliament within the United Kingdom, 
redesigning devolution to extend the powers of the Scottish Parliament (including fiscal 
powers but short of independence) and the Scottish Government’s preferred option, 
independence. (Scottish Government, 2007: vii-viii).  The Scottish Government went to 
great lengths within this document to show that this was not to be a one-way street, 
that all views, even – and perhaps, in particular – those which were opposed to 
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independence, were welcomed within the discussion (Jones, 2008: 51; Mitchell, 2008: 
254).  Chapter 2 of the White Paper saw the Scottish Government propose several 
changes to the constitutional arrangements, proposals that would strengthen 
devolution (Lynch, 2009, 12-13), including the devolution of powers in the field of 
taxation, energy policy, firearms legislation, employment law and broadcasting 
(Scottish Government, 2007: 11-17).  These proposals were pragmatic in their 
approach.  The party recognised that their own constitutional preference – 
independence – was not the constitutional preference of the majority in the Scottish 
Parliament (and, indeed, according to opinion polls, only a minority of the Scottish 
population) (TNS System Three/ Sunday Herald cited Curtice, 2009: 16-17).  Thus, by 
presenting their own, more radical, goal alongside proposals which would provide the 
Scottish Parliament with more powers, the SNP Scottish Government have been able 
to promote their second preference – a considerable extension of powers for the 
Scottish Parliament – as a more reasoned, less radical proposal. 
To engage the public with the constitutional debate, the party launched A National 
Conversation, a three-year long consultation designed as a precursor to the planned 
introduction of a referendum bill to the Scottish Parliament, which was scheduled for 
autumn 2009, followed by a referendum the following year.  The consultation was split 
into three organic phases.  The first phase was launched by First Minister Alex 
Salmond at Napier University on 14th August 2007 to coincide with the launch of 
Choosing Scotland’s Future.  For the following six months, the consultation process 
was predominantly limited to an online debate, with articles by Cabinet members and 
comments, letters and emails from the public, while Alex Salmond delivered several 
public lectures to maintain public interest in the consultation (Keating, 2009: 6).  Seven 
months later, phase two of the process was launched, and was distinctly more public 
oriented, comprising meetings with businesses, trades unions and churches, as well as 
Cabinet ‘roadshow’ events around the country (in the summer of both 2008 and 2009) 
and 29 public question and answer sessions.  These events provided mixed success 
for the SNP, with detailed evidence suggesting the events were well attended and that 
the public were engaged in discussions, but that the constitutional debate was a 
minority concern amongst those who attended (Harvey and Lynch, 2010: 10). 
Finally, phase three of A National Conversation marked the end of the original 
consultation and was intended as the beginning of a referendum campaign.  That the 
referendum campaign itself never materialised is dealt with below.  Nevertheless, the 
consultation had played a significant role in furthering the constitutional debate in 
Scotland, spawning as it did the Unionist parties’ collective response, the Commission 
on Scottish Devolution (chaired by Sir Kenneth Calman).  While the Calman 
Commission’s remit was narrower (it specifically omitted independence from its 
considerations) and its recommendations weaker (minor additions to powers already 
devolved, formalisation of intergovernmental relations and a small step towards fiscal 
autonomy) than the Scottish Government would have liked, it nevertheless provided 
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evidence that the SNP have succeeded in moving the constitutional debate forward – 
and, crucially for them, that the other parties began to move in the direction of 
accepting more devolution (Harvey, 2010: 18). 
2. The All-Wales Convention 
In contrast with the SNP’s position as a minority government, Plaid Cymru’s experience 
of government as the junior partner in coalition with Labour in the NAW has provided 
much more in the way of consensus with regards the constitutional debate.  Equally, 
the fact that devolution in Wales has already been altered – and provision made for 
further devolution – through the Government of Wales Act 2006, has meant that 
political discussion in Wales has already centred on extending devolution.  In this 
respect, the coalition agreement between Labour and Plaid – the One Wales 
Agreement – simply codified a pre-existing consensus within the NAW on the need for 
further (legislative) devolution.  Nevertheless, the coalition was an important watershed 
moment in post-devolution Welsh politics, an ‘unprecedented’ agreement between 
Labour and the nationalists (Scully and Elias, 2008: 107) which was ‘ground-breaking’ 
in its linking two parties which had historically been rivals (McAllister and Cole, 2008: 
543). 
The One Wales Agreement set in formal terms the conditions each party would have to 
sustain for the coalition to continue, with the All-Wales Convention a key component of 
Plaid’s support for the agreement.  The All-Wales Convention had a wide remit, to 
provide information on how the NAW currently operates, to debate the extension of its 
powers and to report to the Welsh Assembly Government its findings at the end of the 
consultation period (All-Wales Convention, 2009).  The process consisted of public 
meetings around Wales as well as written submissions of evidence to the committee.  
In all, 2,700 submissions (All-Wales Convention, 2009) were made, from a variety of 
sources, before the final report of the committee was prepared and presented to the 
Welsh Assembly Government in November 2009.  The All-Wales Convention, chaired 
by former UN diplomat Sir Emyr Jones Parry, began work as an Executive in March 
2008 tasked with several aims.  The first of these was an informative role – educating 
the Welsh public about the role of the NAW and the powers which it currently had 
available, raising awareness of the devolution settlement, how it works and the 
potential impact any change in the powers of the NAW would have on the general 
population.  Its second role was to stimulate discussion on the issue of expanding 
devolution, opening a consultation with the Welsh population on the issue of full law-
making powers.  Finally, the Convention was tasked with analysing the views of the 
public, assessing the mood with regards increased powers and make a 
recommendation to the Welsh Assembly Government on the issue of holding a 
referendum (All-Wales Convention Establishing Committee Report, 2008: xx).   
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In order to fulfil the informative role, the Convention organised over sixty events across 
Wales (All-Wales Convention, 2009).  These ranged from formal meetings between Sir 
Emyr Jones Parry and County Councils across Wales and evidence gathering sessions 
at Welsh institutions – schools, universities and businesses – to more public events, 
including question and answer sessions with the Executive Committee.  The voluntary 
sector played a role in the debate while some of the more unique consultation events 
included a curry night at a Labour Club in Port Talbot and events in shopping centres in 
Bridgend and Caerphilly.  Events were extended to universities, “Question Time” styled 
events, rugby clubs, formal evidence-gathering sessions, even the Royal Welsh Show 
hosted members of the Executive Committee.  In addition, the All-Wales Convention 
website provided visitors the opportunity to contribute their views to the discussion and 
established a page on the social-networking site Facebook which generated a lively 
online discussion. 
In total, the Executive Committee hosted 23 public events, conversing with over 1700 
people, while 13 formal evidence gathering sessions saw evidence provided by 76 
individuals and organisations.  608 organisations from within Wales provided written 
evidence to the AWC and 1,925 individuals completed questionnaires (All-Wales 
Convention, 2009: 13).  Thus, contributions to the All-Wales Convention came from a 
variety of sources, through several different types of event held around the country, in 
different forums and through different mediums, all with the dual purpose of increasing 
the understanding of Welsh devolution examining attitudes towards extending the 
powers of the NAW. 
In its final report, the All-Wales Convention found that the current process, whereby 
Measure-making powers can be transferred to the NAW through Legislative 
Competence Orders – that is, the process set out in Part 3 of the Government of Wales 
Act 2006 – should be abandoned in favour of the instant transfer of legislative powers 
in the twenty Fields as set out in Part 4.  Part 4, according to the All-Wales Convention, 
offers a “substantial advantage” over the current process in several ways.  It would 
allow the process of devolving power to become much more efficient; provide a 
strategic approach in drafting legislation; offer greater clarity in the system which had 
previously been lacking and more consistency with the democratic tradition (All-Wales 
Convention, 2009: 98).  On that basis, the All-Wales Convention recommended a 
referendum in accordance with the stipulation in the Government of Wales Act 2006 
that legislative powers could be transferred in bulk on the acceptance of those plans by 
a majority of the Welsh public. 
3. The Welsh Powers Referendum 2011 
The Government of Wales Act 2006 was categorised in some quarters as a ‘revolution’ 
in Welsh devolution but one which gave something to both proponents and opponents 
of devolution (Navarro and Lambert, 2007: 18-19).  It was a compromise of views 
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within the Labour Party – it delivered more in the way of legislative powers for the NAW 
for devolution supporters but put a number of mechanisms in the way of their transfer, 
enough to satisfy opponents that power would not be transferred overnight (Trench, 
2007: 33).  These mechanisms were set out in detail in Part 3 and Part 4 of the Act, 
with Part 3 indicating that the Assembly could request the transfer of powers one at a 
time through a complex procedure involving Legislative Competence Orders.  
Alternatively, Part 4 made provision for the transfer of powers in all twenty fields 
conditional upon the return of an affirmative vote in a referendum – a referendum which 
could only be called with the agreement of two-thirds of the NAW, the Secretary of 
State for Wales and both Houses of the UK Parliament.  It was, to many, an ‘elegant 
and ingenious’ development (Wyn Jones and Scully, 2008: 64).  It allowed those in 
favour – Plaid and pro-devolutionist parts of Labour and the Liberal Democrats and, 
indeed, Welsh Conservatives – to see devolution moving forward, an opportunity to 
improve the NAW with enhanced powers, while for those opposed the conditions 
imposed upon the transfer of power meant they could still make the argument against 
further powers in a referendum campaign. 
While Plaid campaigned for a referendum in the 2007 Welsh Assembly election – and 
made it a key plank of the coalition’s One Wales Agreement – then Secretary of State 
for Wales, Labour’s Peter Hain was not as keen to move to a referendum quickly.  He 
was adamant that a referendum should not be rushed but that he would support a ‘Yes’ 
vote “when we are confident we can win” (Hain, 2009a, 2009b).  Nevertheless, the 
NAW voted unanimously (53 in favour to zero against) on 9 February 2010 to start the 
parliamentary process toward the referendum.1  Naturally, the consensus – and 
unanimity of the vote – was not a reflection of the influence of Plaid in the constitutional 
debate, but the fact that, in a little under the four years since the Government of Wales 
Act 2006 was passed (and three since its terms were implemented) a consensus of 
opinion in the NAW was formed on holding an early referendum was testament to their 
making the issue a key plank of their support for coalition with Labour.  With a new 
Conservative-led government at Westminster, there was a concern that the referendum 
would be blocked or, at the very least, postponed.  However, incoming Conservative 
Secretary of State for Wales Cheryl Gillan moved quickly to quell those fears, indicating 
that the referendum was ‘a priority’ and that it would be scheduled ‘in the first quarter of 
2011’ (Gillan, 2010).  Thus, a referendum that the pilot of the Government of Wales Act 
2006 did not consider to be imminent (Hain, 2009a) was held in March 2011.  It 
delivered a resounding yes vote, with 63% in favour on a turnout of 35%.  The 220,392 
vote margin was a considerable increase on the margin of just 6,721 in the 1997 
referendum held to establish the NAW (REF).  The result has led to the third radical 
                                                
1  The Record of Proceedings in the National Assembly for Wales for Tuesday, 9 February 
2010, available to view at http://www.assemblywales.org/bus-home/bus-chamber/bus-
chamber-third-assembly-rop.htm?act=dis&id=166346&ds=2/2010#6 (last access June 6, 
2011) 
Harvey, Changing the Constitution                                                                                              8	  
 
change to what is effectively a new Welsh constitution since devolution in 1999: what 
has been described as “National Assembly Mark I” (from 1999-2007, the ‘body 
corporate’ elected-administrative devolution model); “National Assembly Mark II” (from 
2007-2011, the quasi-legislative devolution model, remaining dependent upon 
Westminster for transfer of powers); and a new, post-referendum “Mark III”, a 
legislative National Assembly for Wales with full competence in the twenty Fields set 
out in the Government of Wales Act 2006 (Trench, 2010: 118n).  This final change from 
Mark II to Mark III has been the result of bottom-up regional pressure, pressure which 
Plaid Cymru influenced from the 2007 NAW election and beyond into the One Wales 
Agreement. 
4. The (lack of a) Scottish Referendum 
The same, perhaps, cannot be said of the SNP, at least during the 2007-2011 Scottish 
Parliamentary session. While they delivered on the first half of their manifesto 
commitment by publishing a White Paper on independence, they could not deliver a 
referendum on the issue itself, spending three and a half years building up to it before 
deciding not to bring forward a bill to the Scottish Parliament.  A referendum on 
independence was the key aspect of the SNP’s governing platform – and one which 
was the very least their activists had come to expect from the party’s time in 
government.  However, while the party engaged in A National Conversation as a huge 
(the largest ever conducted by a Scottish Government2) consultation exercise (the 
primary objective of which was to lay the groundwork for a referendum to be held 
during the four-year parliamentary term) no referendum bill was brought forward to the 
Scottish Parliament (Harvey, 2010: 6).  In the first instance, the party was due to lay a 
referendum bill in the Scottish Parliament in November 2009, immediately after the 
publication of the second White Paper, Your Scotland, Your Voice.  However, with the 
bill ready to be heard before an SNP-chaired ad-hoc committee, Labour engineered an 
opportunity to chair the committee (Harvey and Lynch, 2010: 8).  A quick re-think on 
the SNP’s part led to the referendum bill being published as a consultation paper 
instead (Scottish Government, 2010).  This had the dual-effect of keeping the issue of 
a referendum alive through the UK General Election in 2010 and maintaining the 
element of public participation in the process, an element that had been crucial to the 
perceived success of A National Conversation.  During this period, the SNP courted the 
Liberal Democrats with a multi-option referendum, with further powers relating to fiscal 
autonomy (similar to the recommendations of their Steel Commission Report in 2006) 
but the party stayed the course with the Calman Commission, and were duly rewarded 
with the opportunity to implement its recommendations through coalition government at 
Westminster.   Publishing the bill as a consultation paper also had the effect of delaying 
the opportunity to lay the referendum bill in the Scottish Parliament.  That delay 
                                                
2  Interview with Bruce Crawford, SNP MSP and Minister for Parliamentary Business in the 
Scottish Government, May 2010. 
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became a permanent postponement in September 2010 with the news that the SNP 
Scottish Government had decided not to bring forward a referendum bill before the 
election in May 2011, citing the lack of opposition support for the bill and the 
inevitability that they would vote down the bill (The Scotsman, 6 September 2010).  
This was the reality of minority government for the SNP – the necessity of relying upon 
the support of other parties to produce a legislative majority. 
However, despite the lack of a referendum, the SNP have affected change with regards 
the constitutional debate in Scotland.  Prior to the party’s arrival in office in 2007, the 
sub-total of the Unionist parties engagement with enhancing the powers of the Scottish 
Parliament was a little-read Liberal Democrat report entitled Moving to Federalism: A 
New Settlement for Scotland (The Steel Commission, 2006).  With the Scottish 
Government’s National Conversation dominating the constitutional debate, the Unionist 
parties realised that they had to do something to wrest the constitutional initiative back 
from the nationalists.  The establishment of the Commission on Scottish Devolution 
(detailed above) was their response, and though it never engaged with the Scottish 
Government’s constitutional debate, resulting in something of a “disjointed 
constitutional debate” (Trench, 2008: 14-15), the final recommendations of the 
Commission represented a distinct change in policy for the Unionists.  The three 
parties (Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats) now found themselves 
supporting an increase (albeit, a minor one) in the powers of the Scottish Parliament.  
And, indeed, these powers appear ready to be devolved, with the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat UK Government currently legislating to implement the Calman 
recommendations in a new Scotland Bill.  Although the Calman recommendations do 
not go far enough for the SNP – indeed, they were described in interviews with the 
author3 as “feeble, but welcome progress” and a “spoiling tactic for independence” – 
they nevertheless provide evidence that the SNP has influenced constitutional change 
in the UK in the direction of further powers for the Scottish Parliament. 
5. 2011 Regional Elections 
The elections to the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales in May 
2011 brought mixed fortunes for the respective nationalist parties.  In Wales, after Plaid 
had successfully campaigned to hold a referendum to extend the powers of the NAW – 
a campaign which ended with a positive outcome in the referendum itself – the party 
found itself have a disappointing night, losing three seats and seeing the Welsh 
Conservatives overtake them in terms of Assembly Members.  More pressingly, the 
party lost its position as a junior coalition partner in the Welsh Assembly Government 
as Labour returned exactly half of the 60 seats in the Senedd and intended to govern 
                                                
3  Interviews with Alasdair Allan, SNP MSP for the Western Isles (23 March 2010) and Keith 
Brown, SNP MSP for Ochil, Minister for Schools and Skills in the Scottish Government (16 
April 2010). 
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as a minority.  In Scotland, the contrast could not have been greater.  The SNP won a 
stunning victory, capturing 53 of the 73 Scottish Parliamentary constituencies and an 
outright majority in Holyrood with a total of 69 of the 129 seats.  The outright majority 
was all the more remarkable given the additional member electoral system was to 
designed to prevent any party from winning a majority of seats in the Scottish 
Parliament.  What this means for the constitutional debate is clear – the SNP now have 
a mandate to introduce and pass an independence referendum bill, with a likely date of 
2014 for such a vote. 
Conclusion 
The unwritten constitution of the United Kingdom underwent radical change in 1999 as 
the country moved from a centralised political system to a partly decentralised system 
of asymmetrical devolution.  While the UK Parliament has, until very recently, resisted 
pressure for change to the devolved settlement for Scotland, the Welsh case has 
proved much more volatile (Trench, 2010: 118).  Almost from the start there was 
pressure for change from the Presiding Officer of the NAW Dafydd Elis Thomas, 
himself a Plaid Cymru Assembly Member.  He, and others, felt the system of elected 
administrative devolution and the ‘body corporate’ model to be ineffective and within 
the first term created a de facto separation of executive and administrative functions 
(Trench, 2010: 123).  This separation, along with changes to the electoral 
arrangements, increasing the number of members of and bestowing of legislative 
powers upon the NAW, was also recommended by the Richard Commission, adding to 
the pressure for change (Richard Commission, 2004).  Those pressures forced the 
then-Labour UK Government into accepting the need for change, culminating in the 
Government of Wales Act 2006, with its provisions for incremental legislative 
devolution in specific policy areas by request and the immediate transfer of powers in 
all twenty Fields in the event of an affirmative referendum result.  Thus the mechanism 
for further legislative devolution was created, and further pressure as a result of the 
One Wales Agreement – as well as the Report of the All-Wales Convention – led to the 
scheduling of a referendum for early 2011, clear evidence of the bottom-up pressure 
from the regional level influencing potential constitutional change in the Welsh case.  
While the case in Scotland is not as clear cut – with a relatively stable devolution 
settlement delivered in 1999, the Unionist parties have seen little need to alter the 
legislation – there is also evidence that bottom-up pressures from the Scottish 
Parliament have influenced constitutional change.  When the SNP won power in 2007 
and embarked upon their National Conversation consultation on the constitutional 
future of Scotland, they forced a response from the Unionist parties – a Commission on 
Scottish Devolution, tasked to report on the formative years of the devolution project 
and to recommend improvements.  Recommendations they did make, and the 
subsequent UK government is currently in the process of legislating upon them.  By 
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arguing for (and creating a constitutional debate centred upon) independence, the SNP 
have engaged the other parties in Scotland on their constitutional goal, pressuring 
them into adopting a position of favouring more powers short of independence and 
creating a critical mass around this position.  In this respect, the SNP have provided 
the pressure that led to bottom-up calls for an extension to the devolved powers of the 
Scottish Parliament.  In both cases the catalyst for change has been the election of 
nationalist parties into the regional tier of government and the influence they have been 
able to project from this position.  From here, both Plaid Cymru and the SNP have 
been afforded the opportunity to engage the public (and, at length, the Unionist parties) 
in the constitutional debate through consultation processes.  In the Welsh case that has 
led to a post-legislative referendum to imbue the NAW with further legislative powers (a 
referendum which was already on the statute books, the timing of which was open to 
influence) while in Scotland the election of a majority SNP government means that a 
referendum on independence in the present Scottish Parliamentary term appears a 
certainty, while the position of influence the party now finds itself in may lead to further 
powers being devolved through the Scotland Bill.  The UK constitution is under 
pressure, and while Wales may have travelled this far and no further for the time being, 
the SNP’s stunning electoral victory means that further devolution to the Scottish 
Parliament is now inevitable – and end of the Union is a real possibility. 
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